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ABSTRACT 
 
Widely misunderstood and often maligned, rhetoric in the simplest sense is the effective use of 
language in speech or writing.  Much as law and medicine have well considered standards of 
conduct, so too does the field of communication.  Experts in this area look at “patterns” of discourse 
in relation to specific kinds of events – tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, fires, airline or mining 
disasters, for example. Close study of such phenomenon reveals which communication approaches 
to crisis are successful and which are not. As a profession, rhetoricians study the structure and 
consequences of communication events.  Applying rhetorical analysis to situations as significant in 
scope as Katrina allows us to determine what business, media, and government can learn from that 
unprecedented day in the Summer of 2005.  This paper concludes with a practical communication 
model, (R.E.S.P.O.N.D.), which can be applied in any crisis situation real or anticipated. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
risis is not unimaginable.  Indeed every organization can and should expect to experience some kind of 
crisis during its lifetime.  No company, country, or individual is immune.  From the perspective of 
Organization Theory and Design crisis affects the stability of a system; threatens its homeostasis or 
balance, Katz (1966); Tubbs (2007).  From a personal perspective crisis is anything that handicaps response.  In every 
case, crisis exists when that which could once be done, can be done no more.   
 V
 
 Divorce parts families. Earthquakes bring down buildings.  Fires burn away forests and homes; mines 
collapse. Tsunamis wash away residents and resorts.  Terrorists try to create a climate of fear.  All of these can be 
imagined and anticipated, and because this is so; it is possible to plan, wholly or in part, for any conceivable threat.  
As a discipline Public Relations has operated under this assumption since the 20th century, and rhetorical theory, at 
least since the 5th century B.C., has been laying the foundation for a universal crisis communication model.  When 
crisis is conceived of as process, the need for a rhetorical model becomes obvious.  To that end, this paper provides a 
critical examination of the communication issues generated by Katrina and concludes with a practical and rhetorically 
oriented model of communication which can be applied to any situation real or anticipated. 
 
AUGUST 29TH, 2005:  A RHETORICAL POSTMORTEM 
 
 Even now, looking back we wonder why.  Why were so many people left in harm's way.  To explain we need 
only take a look at the communication context in which the event occurred.  "In all of the 20th Century only three 
category five hurricanes were recorded. Category 5 hurricanes, with winds faster than 155 mph, are rare with only 
three hitting the USA in the 20th century. . ."(Williams, 2005).  This places the statistical likelihood of having 
experiencing one in the U.S. at only .03%.   
 
For any threat to take hold, two things are necessary:  first, people must understand the threat, and second, 
they must be capable of complying, (Watzlawick, 1977).  At least four groups of people were in Katrina's path in 
August of 2005.  First, were those who could leave and who did so with whatever money and resources were available 
to them.  Second, were those for whom, the danger did not seem all that real.  We might call this the "experts in 
danger" syndrome - a class of people made up of individuals who have met dangers before and whom, consider 
themselves experts at overcoming those challenges.  It is the expert swimmer who goes out too far in rough waters; 
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the skier who drives in whiteout conditions; and the shoreline resident who has waited out strong storms in the past.  
For these individuals the perceived danger does not reach a sufficient level of threat and they stand their ground.   
 
There are times when fight should become flee.  Experts in danger are sometimes the last to recognize this 
fact and the consequences can be disastrous.   
 
Third, there is that group of people who wanted to leave but who lacked the resources.  Either no money or 
transportation was available or the existing opportunities were unaffordable.  Relocating for some of those on the 29th 
might eat up a month, possibly more income in the relocation and return home.  Many could not spare these funds.  
And, finally, there were those too ill or too old to move without substantial physical assistance.  Were these people 
deliberately neglected, as some media sources would wonder?  Or worse, was no thought given to them at all.  Could 
they somehow have been invisible to the planners?  Such did seem to be the case as the days wore on.  Yet the author 
of this paper believes that deliberate neglect was not to blame.  Rather, a systems level communication breakdown, 
both human and technological, accounted for the overall calamity of Katrina. 
 
KATRINA AND COMMUNICATION BREAKDOWN  
 
 It is not uncommon for writers to pose that catastrophic events are not the cause of any one single thing going 
wrong, but rather a tragic series of them.  Most everything, concerning communication that could have gone wrong 
during Katrina did.  Noted earlier, communication analysts look for patterns of behavior.  Typically, in any given 
crisis a credible, knowledgeable, calm, articulate spokesperson (think NTSB) takes charge of the event and notes:   
 
what has occurred is rare, we are not wholly sure what has happened, we are gathering information even as we 
speak, all information will be released as available and appropriate, we have taken every measure to lessen the 
likelihood of a similar event now or in the future, here are pictures and stories of the help being provided, and 
(finally), the situation has been stabilized.   
 
This general pattern emerges whether the crisis has to do with product tampering, vehicle recalls; man made or natural 
disasters of any kind.  It is predictable, appropriate, and most of all important. As a communication strategy it puts a 
rhetorical frame on the situation, making it manageable; the very kind of frame not in place when Katrina struck.  
Human and technological systems were simply overwhelmed. 
 
 Katrina knocked out the phones.  Power outages meant no TV and no radio without batteries.  Damaged 
towers meant no cell service.  Local radio stations were down.  EAS was less than effective - where were people told 
to go, when were they told, what physical systems were in place to help relocate them, and why did subsequent news 
stories never address this failure?  People could not call out for help and rescue teams could not call in. The event was 
too large in scope for the current level of planning.  Who's in charge, what priorities are in effect, how long will this 
take, what's necessary?  All these questions lay at the heart of the communication overload accompanying Katrina.  
One witness observed that rescue personnel were reduced to 18th century-like forms of communication with runners 
carrying information to and from the scene of “battle”.  
 
THE NATIONAL MEDIA 
 
 Compounding the communication problems in the summer of 2005 was the loss of three of the most trusted 
American newsmen.  Peter Jennings, Tom Brockaw, and Dan Rather, were all in the anchor seat during 9/11 and each 
did an extraordinary job of guiding viewers during this difficult time.  Each was well seasoned and at the helm in 
September of 2001 but gone when Katrina arrived.  Competent as their replacements might be, they could not have 
carried the same weight as these three men.   
 
 As news teams struggled to address the situation they had to negotiate a complex communication 
environment fraught with difficulties and one which differed from the familiar patterns of the past.  No one could say, 
"We're not wholly sure what's happened," because every news source and viewer did know.  Watching TV the 
enormity of the storm was revealed and engineers lined up to testify to the expected magnitude of the event if the 
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levees didn't hold.  This hurricane was freakish in size and scope.  Putting a manageable frame around it would require 
the highest level of skill and experience.  Information, at the start, was sketchy at best; little help, if any, was apparent; 
and the visuals showed only destruction and despair.  Comforting "here's the help" footage would be a long time 
coming.  Instead, day after day cries of "we need help" were witnessed.  This situation was anything but stable.   
 
 Among the best known reporters covering the event were Geraldo Reviera and Shephard Smith.  Speaking 
with Bill O'Reilly, Riviera and Smith worked to bring home the emotional impact of the aftermath.  Riviera at the 
Superdome:  "Look at this baby.  I have a baby.  Let these people leave, let them walk. . ." Shephard Smith, "I've been 
saying it for days, I 10, Exit 235, where is the help."  O'Reilly counsels "let's get some perspective here," and, in a rare 
moment on his show, Smith and Shephard rebuke him saying, "this is the perspective, we're right here, we know."  
The experience of Katrina looked very different on the ground than in the studio.  Rivera and Smith revealed 
emotional intelligence in their courageous coverage and put their careers in jeopardy by doing so.  Every reporter 
knows the story of the Hindenburgh and the emotional telling of the story that lost the reporter his job. 
 
WHAT PUBLIC RELATIONS TEACHES 
 
 A great deal has been written in the Public Relations literature concerning communication and crisis 
management. Some writers believe that it is not possible to plan for every contingency (Stanton, 2002) and one author 
titles his work:  “Crisis communication; if it had a precedent, it wouldn’t be a crisis” (Tortorella, 1989).  The majority, 
however, rightly suggest that planning is not only possible, but essential.  Malozzi (1994) contends that every crisis 
has four phases “1) crisis preparedness; 2) the initial response; 3) maintaining ongoing corrective actions until the 
crisis has run its course; and 4) evaluation and follow-up.”  Gilman (2002) suggests that managing communication 
means managing information flow, and that the process involves:  “(1) identifying the key groups that will potentially 
be affected by the event, (2) selecting spokespeople; and (3) managing the timing and distribution of information.”  
 
Having a protocol in place and preparing in advance is a theme that repeats again and again in the writings of 
forward looking authors.  Rene Henry former chair of the Public Relation’s Society of America rose to the number 
one spot on Amazon.com with his book:  You’d better have a hose if you want to put out a fire.   Henry observes:  
“The companies, organizations, and institutions most vulnerable to a crisis are those whose managers believe they are 
immune.  And, most management teams are either unprepared or under-prepared to deal with a crisis (2002).”  In his 
work on the Red River Valley flood Seeger points out “the need for an approach to crisis communication that moves 
beyond the traditional models of image restoration.  Viewing crisis as an ongoing process of discovery and renewal is 
more fitting for a crisis that extends beyond questions of image (2001).” David Hall, in his extensive review of the 
crisis communication literature agrees noting: 
 
The crisis communication literature today overwhelmingly takes a public relations perspective.  Crisis communication 
with the public is critically important and warrants the attention it has received in the literature.  However, as 
conveyed by the models presented here, public relations represents only a subset of the communication activities 
necessary during crisis response.  The public relations literature focuses predominantly on one communication step 
(dissemination) and one stakeholder group (the public).  The results of this study suggests that other essential crisis 
response communication steps (observation, interpretation, and choice) must be performed as precursors to 
dissemination and will influence the ability of an organization to rapidly end the response phase and end the risk of 
immediate damage. 
 
Several things become apparent in the Public Relation studies.  (1) with an estimated 6,000 “newsworthy 
organizational crisis events reported annually,” managers stand a strong likelihood of being tested;  (2) advanced 
planning is a must, and (3) there is a specific need for a crisis communication model that is organized around a 
rhetorical protocol.  While the majority of PR writing discusses phases in the evolution and resolution of crises, these 
writers do not specifically provide a rhetorically based, systems level model for communication during a crisis.  
Learning from Katrina, this paper fills the gap. 
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GENERAL LESSONS FROM KATRINA 
 
 Generally there are things we know now, that perhaps, we did not know then.  First is the need for CERT - 
communication emergency response teams.  Such teams should have the latest technology - satellite phones and 
computers, and be guided by a protocol establishing, without question, who is in charge concerning which matters and 
when the decisions of each person might be overridden by someone of higher authority.  In any crisis seconds matter.  
It is a given that medical triage needs to be in place, but it is also essential that medical plans be coupled with the 
political and communication arrangements which give them their greatest chance for success.   
 
Second, Katrina taught the importance of providing communication in a coordinated, timely, and consistent 
manner.  Could not flyers, if nothing else, have been dropped to those standing on I 10 promising when comfort and 
aid would be forthcoming.  Could nothing have been done to let these people know they were not forgotten?   
 
And third, we learned, or learned again, the importance of combining communication with security so that 
first responders are not put in danger.  When the military arrived we saw the kind of accomplishment that can be 
coordinated when security and communication systems are simultaneously in place.  All of this we have learned 
generally, what remains is what we has been learned specifically through this study of Katrina. 
 
R.E.S.P.O.N.D:  KATRINA'S MOST IMPORTANT LESSON 
 
 At the start of this paper it was noted that rhetoric concerns the effective use of language in speech or writing.  
Additionally it was observed that communication can be guided by principles of rhetoric much like medicine and law 
are governed by the protocols associated with those fields.  Law speaks of the three Ps:  proof, procedures, and 
pleadings.  Medicine is sometimes driven by anacronyms like:  ABC. 
 
What follows is an original, rhetorically guided model of crisis communication drawn from close study of 
Katrina and her aftermath. Arguably the model presented below might be used to address any potential crisis situation 
real, or imagined: 
 
Step One: Realize Possibilities 
Step Two: Evaluate Consequences 
Step Three: Specify What Needs To Be Done 
Step Four: Plan Systemically 
Step Five: Optimize Information Flow 
Step Six: Never Wait to Communicate 
Step Seven: Determine Plans for Future Crisis 
 
 While all these steps are important, step one might be the most important of all.  It is difficult to respond to 
something that has never been considered as a possibility.  For individuals this may involve considerations of 
catastrophic illness or job loss.  Companies need to envision competitors, economic shifts, changes in delivery 
systems brought about by the internet, consumer lawsuits, threats of many kinds.  And countries, particularly in the 
post 9/11 world need to consider the possibility of attack on person or property and the potential threats do not stop 
there.  Among other considerations are:  illegal immigration, crime, natural disaster, aging transportation systems, 
computer system assaults, and war to name just a few.   
 
 Step two asks that we examine any potential crisis from a systems perspective.  What are all the 
consequences that might be foreseen?  If the primary earner in a family becomes ill who is additionally affected - 
children, spouse, dependent and aging parents?  Should a massive recall be necessary how might this be accomplished 
without demise of the organization?  How many vendors will be affected?  How many consumers?  Will cuts in jobs 
be necessary to cover costs?  If a country must go to war does it have the necessary resources in terms of equipment, 
technology, and personnel?  What effect will such an initiative have on the economy?  On security?  When taxes are 
raised is there a concomitant rise in bankruptcy?  Should the Fed raise or lower interest rates?  If a major earthquake 
occurred in California would there enough blood in the banks to treat the injured?  All of these are systems level 
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questions.  If every shape in the Kaleidoscope formation is not consider there will be some area of the crisis where 
non response could be the order of the day. 
 
 In step three we take measure of what specifically needs to be done in the event that possibility becomes 
reality.  Specifically should a company settle lawsuits or fight them?  Should a nation make military investments 
primarily in air, sea, or ground support?  Should a wall be built to the north or south?  What specifically does a person, 
company or nation need to do should its worst fears be realized?  In step three these questions are answered no matter 
how daunting they may first appear to be. 
 
 Step four cautions that we must remember that any change in a system most always result in a change in the 
other part of the system.  If an individual takes out long term disability insurance but never needs it, that money might 
have been spent elsewhere or invested.  If s/he works two jobs for extra income, fatigue could make family and job 
relationships suffer.  If a company does not maintain its reputation it can have losses both domestic and global.  If a 
country deploys its National Guard in one capacity, it may not be available for deployment in another.  It is essential 
that crisis plans be made with systems theory in mind. 
 
 In step five every consideration is given to the optimization of information flow.  Who needs to know what 
and when?  Who needs to be the primary spokesperson for the issues at each level.  If technology fails what back up 
systems are in place?  If an EAS broadcast goes out has the specific wording and timing of the announcement been 
considered?  What barriers exist to understanding? Any crisis management plan is only as good as the ability to 
disseminate information quickly, accurately, and effectively. 
 
 Step six requires that those managing a crisis never wait to communicate.  As David Eisenberg (1991) notes:  
“Instant action is required.  In all crisis management plans time is the key.” Communication, particularly during a 
critical event, both creates and resolves expectations.  People need to hear words of guidance, support, and comfort.  
They need to know that someone is in charge and that they are not alone.  In the absence of communication people 
will make up their own, possibly dangerous, understanding of events.  The best way to quell damaging rumors and 
possible panic is by giving out accurate, trustworthy information. Putting people in touch with credible expert opinion, 
as quickly as possible, is of paramount importance. 
 
 Finally,  is the importance of discussing plans for the future.  Anything that has been learned from a current 
crisis must be fed back in for future consideration.  What, for example, is known about future threats now that the 
current crisis has passed?  How can we better manage the event the next time it occurs?  What differences might 
present themselves?  Thinking of R.E.S.P.O.N.D. as a communication loop requiring constant feedback, allows for 
the possibility of continual improvements.  Any crisis that happens once, can happen again, and each time something 
might be learned as has been the case with Katrina. 
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